Radio games carried out by the bodies of state security of the USSR during the great Patriotic war, nullified the work of German intelligence against the Soviet Union and became a very large contribution to the Victory, told RIA Novosti historian of the Russian special services, is the author of numerous articles and books on radiograph Vladimir Makarov.
Under radiogra means the use of radio communications to mislead the intelligence agencies of the enemy. Seventy-five years ago, on may 5, 1945, ended radiogra “Berezino” is one of the most famous radioigr conducted domestic intelligence against the intelligence of the Third Reich. In fact, it summed up more than 180 radioigr, which was carried out by the NKVD-KGB and the military counter-intelligence SMERSH in the war years.
“Disinformation” for the Nazis
Radio games appeared during the First world war, their first, apparently, was used by the German special services in the struggle against the British commandos, who were thrown into Holland, Belgium and France, said Makarov.
“Soviet intelligence agencies after the beginning of the great Patriotic war very quickly adopted the practice radioigr. According to historical sources it is known that the first radiogra with the purpose of disinformation of the enemy was conducted by the Special Department of the North-Western front in September 1941,” — said the historian.
But the wide distribution of radio games with German intelligence received after the spring of 1942, the intelligence agencies of the Third Reich began in droves to throw in the Soviet rear agents-parachutists with radio stations, said the expert.
In fact, the main period of the history radioigr conducted by Soviet intelligence agencies, counts from the April 25, 1942, when the people’s Commissar of internal Affairs Lavrenty Beria submitted to the Chairman of the State defense Committee Stalin a Memorandum on the detainees in the spring of that year the German agents with walkie-talkies, said Makarov.
“The NKVD of the USSR considers that captured a German radio station can be used in the interests of the high command of the red army to deceive the enemy in regard to dislocations and rearrangements of the red army,” — said in a note.
Approval for this was obtained, and further misinformation materials in radiograp of the NKVD-NKGB and established in 1943, the military counter-intelligence SMERSH purposefully addressed to the German military command.
Vladimir Makarov has told, what were the preconditions for successful radioigr the Soviet secret services. “Unlike radioigr, which carried out the Germans, we carried out centrally, with the participation of the General staff. In our staff worked as a separate group, which was preparing disinformation materials. And worked the best Soviet General staff,” — said the historian.
Each radiogra prepared very carefully, he added.
“The majority of agents, radio operators who were abandoned by the Germans on Soviet land, was in the organs of our counterintelligence voluntarily surrendered, wanting to atone to the country. Of course, before you start the next radio game, these people passed a thorough inspection. In the case immediately entered another huge mechanism, which allowed him to see how sincere these agents,” — said the historian.
In addition, it was necessary to understand what the radio operators are the conventional signals, which are supposed to broadcast their German “masters” in the case pereverbovki the Soviet secret services.
“Back in the fall of 1942, the NKVD was prepared a first draft of the user sent from the territorial and military counter-intelligence agencies. According to one of the points of the user, needed to know what the agent signals work under control of the Soviet security organs. It was all spelled out in detail as “our father,” — said Makarov.
Also, according to him, except employees of the NKVD-NKGB and SMERSH, who worked with the detainees and recruited by radio operators, each airing was controlled and Radiocontrast.
“In the case of a successful radiogra agents criminally liable not only was not involved, and often rewarded,” said the historian.
Masking for reliability
“In order for our misinformation passed and to minimize the probability of failure of specific radio games, there have been masking events,” — said Makarov. This was done to ensure that the possible German agents in the Soviet rear would directly or indirectly confirm “reliable” information received by German intelligence from the Soviet KGB.
For example, the direction of the main attack army in a particular period can be determined by where the troops are concentrated. “But Moscow was the center of all Railways in the USSR. And, as in the Moscow region, the Germans threw their agents-scouts, on the ring road in the capital allowed trains from platforms disguised as equipment, ammunition, to show that somewhere is preparing the offensive of the Soviet troops. Built and dummy ammunition storage, weapons, equipment,” — said Makarov.
“Such a curious moment. The Germans tracked and movement of the top leaders of the red army, commanders of the fronts, for example, Georgy Zhukov. It is clear that where a special train will leave the headquarters of Zhukov, they should expect the impact of the Soviet troops. The Germans reported that the headquarters of Zhukov left there and then. Actually, of course, he was in another place,” the historian said.
With radio games failed to prevent a massive RAID on Moscow bombers of the Luftwaffe, which was planned by the Nazis on June 22, 1942, the first anniversary of their attack on the Soviet Union.
“During a famous radio games “Monastery-Couriers” were transferred to the Germans that the air defense of Moscow sharply increased in the district capital further transferred to several fighter regiments, part of the antiaircraft artillery, searchlights, balloons. The Germans abandoned plans to make the RAID”, — said Makarov.
“German intelligence in radiograp misinformed, for example about the power of Soviet tank factories. Depending on the situation or had to downplay, or, conversely, to exaggerate the volumes of produced equipment”, — said the expert.
Radio games were used to counter German intelligence in the rear of the red army — in particular, to frustrate attempts to organize a nationalist speech in different regions of the USSR and to stop the sabotage on the Railways. “For example, it was very important to protect the rail connections to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk oblasts, which was a technique that lend-lease supplied to USSR allies,” — said Makarov.
And for greater reliability, to strengthen the German intelligence services in her thoughts about the advantage over the Soviet intelligence services, especially the KGB used a special reception held some radiogra, demonstrating his alleged incompetence.
“There was such a term — “under the sign of failure.” In these radiograph was rude, clumsy work of the Soviet security organs that can “see through”. In fact, the Soviet secret service that did the same for the transmission of misinformation,” — said Makarov.
Radioigr tactics during the war evolved, the expert said.
After the Red army in 1944, liberated the territory of the Soviet Union and moved to the West, radio games are increasingly used to support offensive operations of Soviet troops.
“For example, during the Budapest offensive in Hungary in early 1945. There came troops of the 3rd Ukrainian front. For the rout of the Wehrmacht, which broke through to Budapest to help the environment in the Hungarian capital forces of the Nazis, the Management of counterintelligence SMERSH 3rd Ukrainian front had the radio game, entitled “Communications,” — said Makarov.
“The Germans believed the misinformation given to them during the radio games, and removed from the mainstream of considerable strength. This has allowed our troops to eliminate breakthrough of the Nazis,” — said the historian.
In General, according to him, radio games allowed the Soviet command to conduct disinformation activities on a wide range of problems that faced the red army. The result radioigr opponent successfully misled not just about the deployment of individual battalions and regiments and armies, said Makarov.
German intelligence services are unable to provide the Wehrmacht reliable information about the plans of the red army, about the dislocation of its units. In the end managed to save lives is not something that tens and hundreds of thousands of our soldiers and officers, he added.
“The Germans also failed to disrupt the Soviet rear. Our state security agencies have cleared thousands of German saboteurs, as well as tens of thousands of weapons, explosives and ammunition not fired and exploded in the Soviet rear,” — said Makarov. In addition, using radioigr attempts were stopped by the German intelligence service to assassinate leaders of the Soviet state.
According to him, radio games had another feature — they were all prepared and carried out by the Soviet secret services creatively. “The patterns here were not good. And so we can rightly say that the radio games of the Soviet security organs were genuine examples of the operational art. And given the impact of their results on the success of our army we are talking about the art of military leadership,” — said Makarov.
“You can say that the Soviet secret services during radioigr utterly beat the enemy. Essentially, the great machine of the German intelligence service worked in vain. And because a huge contribution to the Victory of the organizers and participants in those radioigr,” — said the historian.
“Blissful ignorance” of Otto Skorzeny
From mid-1943, after the battle of Kursk, the initiative on the Soviet-German front finally passed to the red army. In this regard, the German intelligence agencies were tasked to intensify reconnaissance and sabotage work in the front line and in the Soviet rear.
The organs of state security of the USSR could not just timely to uncover these plans, but also to strike back, an example of such work was radiogra “berezyne”, launched in the summer of 1944, said Makarov.
She thought out of nowhere, and was a logical continuation of the large radio games “Monastery-Couriers”, which in 1941 led the 4th Department of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR. Then the security officers had brought to German intelligence information about the alleged presence in the Moscow underground monarchist organization called “the Throne.” The protagonist of the operation was experienced and trusted agent of the Soviet secret police Alexander Demyanov that German intelligence believed, as my reliable assistant.
In 1944, Demyanov, according to the operational plan of the game, was sent to the newly liberated from the Nazis, Minsk, ostensibly to serve in one of the units. From him soon, as well as from other agents of the NKGB and SMERSH reported roaming in the forests of Belarus disparate groups of Germans, seeking to break through the front line. Intercept materials indicative of the desire of the German command to render them every assistance on leaving the Russian rear simultaneously using the in the interests of carrying out subversive activities in the immediate rear of the red Army.
On this it was decided to play. The daring plan the new operation was to legendirovat before the German intelligence alleged the presence of large German military units hiding in the forests of Belarus and is trying to establish a connection with the command of the Wehrmacht.
Demyanov handed over to the Germans, that accidentally came into contact with came in Belarus surrounded the military part numbering almost 2 thousand people. Demyanov reported that this part is in dire need of food, clothing, and most importantly, weapons and ammunition, and that its promotion is difficult because of the large number of wounded.
The role of a commander of a German unit located in the small town of Berezino just over one hundred kilometers from Minsk, sang taken from the officers ‘ pow camp, a former regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Gerhard Scherhorn.
In place of the operation in Belarus left the group of outstanding Soviet spies, staff of 4-th Management of people’s Commissariat of state security of the USSR. The group consisted of its head Naum Eitingon, the developer of the operation Isidore Maklerski, Yakov Serebryansky, George Mordvinov, William Fisher (later known in the history of intelligence under the name of Rudolf Abel).
In addition, employees 4-go Department of the NKGB selected in “part of Sherborne” have been trained to be like soldiers of the Wehrmacht — including basic training in the German language. But “part of Sherborne” was formed the three groups from among the members of the special forces KGB — they were supposed to meet arriving agents-parachutists.
Interestingly, in order to ensure the existence of “part of Sherborne” to the area was infiltrated paratroopers from the special forces, commanded a “spy number one” of the Third Reich, Otto Skorzeny. But these “guests”, as the other agents of German intelligence sent to help Sherborne, failed to disarm.
“The Soviet KGB several times during the war, “crossed swords” with Skorzeny and his men, and always successfully. Skorzeny himself, judging by his memories, until the end of his life remained blissfully unaware of what a “virtual hike” of Sherborne and parts for the Soviet rear was actually brilliantly realized by the operation of the Soviet secret police,” — said Makarov.
In the end, the security officers drove German intelligence by the nose to the end of the war. The first of may 1945 the Germans handed Sherborne a telegram, which reported on the suicide of Hitler. “It was the Soviet secret police was one of the first circumstantial evidence that Hitler is really dead,” — said Makarov.
And on 5 may 1945 German intelligence sent a last telegram to the address of Sherborne. “The superiority of the enemy forces defeated Germany… With a heavy heart we have to stop helping you,” — stated in the message. So, the Nazis themselves put the point in the history radioigr in which the Soviet secret service won an unconditional triumph.